Impact of corporate governance and institutional context on multilatinas' reporting quality

Diego Andrés Correa-Mejía

Diego Andrés Correa-Mejía is based at the Accounting Sciences Department, Universidad de Antioquia, Medellin, Colombia.

Abstract

Purpose – *This study aims to identify the impacts of corporate governance (CG) and institutional context on multilatinas' corporate reporting quality (CRQ). CG and institutional context facilitate the reduction of agency problems and the existence of accountability processes that minimize information asymmetries.*

Design/methodology/approach – *A panel data model was developed from a sample of 77 multilatinas studied during the 2014–2020 period. Different estimations were carried out through the panel data model to identify the impact of CG and institutional context on CRQ.*

Findings – *It is evidenced that appropriate CG structure has a positive impact on multilatinas' CRQ. In addition, each country's regulatory quality is confirmed to have a positive effect on firms to produce higher-quality reports.*

Practical implications – *This research provides empirical support to what is put forward by agency and stakeholder theory regarding the role that CG and institutional context play in reducing information asymmetries and improving accountability processes to all stakeholders in the Latin American context.*

Originality/value – *This study contributes original results to the existing literature. Unlike previous works, the present research analyzed multilatinas facing social and political contexts that differ from those of multinationals from developed countries. Different ways of reporting were also covered, going beyond traditional ways of evaluating CRQ – which generally take the sustainability report as a basis.*

Keywords *Corporate governance, Corporate reporting, Multilatinas, Sustainability, Business transparency*

Paper type *Research paper*

1. Introduction

The accountability process has become one of the main mechanisms for monitoring agency and corruption problems (Samet and Jarboui, 2017). Firms face multiple information demands from their stakeholders (Said *et al.*, 2009) that go beyond the financial sphere and facilitate the evaluation of business performance from multiple dimensions. According to Correa-García *et al.* (2018), corporate reporting has become the main means of communication between companies and their stakeholders. However, as previous studies have shown, different types of reports have emerged in the business domain because presenting nonfinancial information in corporate reports is voluntary (Stolowy and Paugam, 2018). Venturelli *et al.* (2018) identified four types of corporate reports: the annual report (AR); the sustainability report (SR); the combined report (CR); and the integrated report (IR).

Previous studies including Bacha and Ajina (2019) and Mohamed-Adnan *et al.* (2018) have revealed that an appropriate corporate governance (CG) structure has a positive effect on business transparency. Bacha and Ajina (2019) argue the level of business transparency lessens information asymmetry, increases investor recognition and reduces monitoring costs, whereas Hussain *et al.* (2018) show business sustainable performance is increased

Received 14 September 2021
Revised 13 January 2022
27 January 2022
Accepted 2 March 2022

The author wish to acknowledge the financial support from the Universidad de Antioquia for the research project 2019-26130.

by CG. Nevertheless, these studies have mainly been conducted in developed economies and the impact of CG structure may vary for Latin America (Duque-Grisales and Aguilera-Caracuel, 2019).

Authors such as Macias and Farfan-Lievano (2017), Aguilera *et al.* (2017) and Correa-García *et al.* (2020) have highlighted the importance of studying multilatinas because the contexts where they operate can lead to results differing from those obtained in developed economies. Multilatinas are significantly different with respect to multinationals that originated in developed countries, as noted by Duque-Grisales and Aguilera-Caracuel (2019). Fiaschi *et al.* (2017) claim multilatinas must develop their corporate purpose under institutionally weak settings; limited state control; high levels of risk for business development; low CG culture; high levels of corruption; and high political risks.

In this context, this study contributes to the scientific discussion related to the impact of CG and institutional context on corporate reporting quality (CRQ) of companies belonging to emerging economies. This scientific discussion is not only based on the agency theory but it is also based on the stakeholder theory developed by Freeman (1984), the upper echelons theory developed by Hambrick and Mason (1984) and the institutional theory worked by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Overall, these theories address the problem of information asymmetry, the management of stakeholder expectations, the diversity of perspectives on boards of directors and the way institutions influence accountability behaviors.

This work aims to identify the impacts of CG and institutional context on multilatinas' CRQ. To this end, the composition of boards of directors was analyzed in 77 multilatinas, for the 2014–2020 period, in terms of size, diversity and existence of a sustainability committee. Institutional context was also considered based on regulatory quality in the multilatinas' countries of origin, as per the index published by the World Bank (2020). The analysis was performed through a panel data model used in previous studies (Kachouri and Jarboui, 2017). For the estimation of the model, the type of corporate reporting was taken as dependent variable and robustness tests were conducted using the SR's compliance level as dependent variable (Hussain *et al.*, 2018).

This study contributes to the literature in three main areas. First, appropriate CG structure is revealed to have a positive effect on multilatinas' CRQ. Second, countries' regulatory quality is confirmed to have a positive impact on companies to produce higher-quality reports. Third, it contributes to the limited existing literature on multilatinas. These results have a major impact because Latin America is characterized as a region with emerging markets that have barely been explored, with its multinationals adopting diverse internationalization strategies, as explained by Lopez-Morales (2018). The results have implications for information preparers, who must meet stakeholders' demands; for regulators, because firms' adoption of good accountability practices will depend on the quality of said regulators' standards; and for the highest business bodies as they must endeavor to form boards of directors which allow for monitoring corporate management, preventing management's interests from deviating and reducing information asymmetries.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, the review of the literature and hypotheses development was conducted. Then, the methodology, including the description of the sample, variables and model, is presented, followed by a description of the results obtained. Lastly, the discussion of the results, general conclusions, implications and limitations are presented and future lines of research are discussed.

2. Literature review and hypotheses development

The existing literature has shown the importance of publishing information to lessen agency problems (Khan *et al.*, 2013) and satisfy stakeholder expectations (Moratis and Brandt, 2017). Corporate reports have evolved to report on both mandatory financial aspects and nonfinancial aspects that are usually voluntary (Said *et al.*, 2009), although content and presentation are diverse because of their voluntary nature (Bacha and Ajina, 2019). Correa-García *et al.* (2018) analyzed the types of reports published by companies and classified them into AR, SR, CR and IR.

Rivera-Arrubla *et al.* (2016) determined the IR is the report with the highest quality amid current business practices. This report is characterized by generating information on firms' tangible and intangible assets as well as concisely communicating business strategy; forms of CG; performance; and perspectives for creating value over the short, medium and long term (IIRC, 2013). On the other hand, financial information and SRs are contained jointly within both the CR and the IR; nonetheless, the latter is seen as a higher-quality report because the former does not provide information on the firm's value creation (Correa-García *et al.*, 2018).

The SR mainly encompasses nonfinancial information. According to Correa-García *et al.* (2021), despite there being different guidelines for preparing the SR, the guidelines created by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) are the most used in Latin America, under the comprehensive and core options. Under the comprehensive option, the SR reveals that all the indicators for each dimension were evaluated and disclosed by the company, whereas under the core option, the SR shows that at least one indicator for each dimension was evaluated and disclosed by the company (GRI, 2016). Lastly, the AR – the traditional report – mainly focuses on financial aspects; its main limitation is that companies are unable to provide their stakeholders with enough information about the value creation process in the long term (Mio, 2020).

Although prior studies have evaluated company report types in the Latin American context (Macias and Farfan-Lievano 2017; Correa-García *et al.*, 2018), Lopez-Morales (2018) argues the study of multilatinas remains a regional issue which has only just started to make its way into global discussions. Duque-Grisales and Aguilera-Caracuel (2019) and Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) emphasize these companies should be studied in depth given they are organizations that have undergone late internationalization processes and, despite being multinational companies, are yet to become big players in the international markets (Castro-Olaya *et al.*, 2015).

Duque-Grisales and Aguilera-Caracuel (2019) assert multilatinas differ greatly from other companies in emerging economies because they must face weak institutions across the region and high levels of corruption that can challenge the proper application of existing corporate theories (Fiaschi *et al.*, 2017). Similarly, there is a noticeable lack in the region of organizational culture, which has constrained the forming of appropriate CG structures that are useful when facing agency problems (Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2014). Based on the gaps in the literature identified by Lopez-Morales (2018), this study combines two key elements which affect the accountability process: CG and regulatory quality in Latin American countries.

From the agency theory, CG is a mechanism that reduces the problems' existence between principal and agents (Aluchna *et al.*, 2020). In this sense, Oino (2019) establishes that good CG practices allow the interests of the owners to be supported because the actions of the managers will be permanently controlled.

Previous studies have shown the existing positive impact of CG on business transparency (Correa-García *et al.*, 2020). CG is a mechanism for avoiding agency problems and monitoring directors' management Correa-Mejía *et al.* (2020); managers are thus pressured by a group of individuals to produce information regarding the various dimensions of the firm (Kachouri and Jarboui, 2017). Chijoke-Mgbame *et al.* (2019) found a positive relationship between CG structure and the quality of the information generated by firms.

Siagian *et al.* (2013) have used the governance index to approach CG quality. This index contemplates aspects relating to the regularity of board meetings, board composition, types of committees and renewal periods for senior management (Akbar *et al.*, 2016). In their study, Kachouri and Jarboui (2017) found that the governance index is positively related to business transparency: good CG practices promote nonfinancial information disclosures that satisfy stakeholders' demands (Kachouri and Jarboui, 2017). Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H1. The governance index has a positive impact on CRQ.

The board of directors is the central part of CG because the different committees are created from there. In addition, the board of directors makes the most critical decisions in a firm (Alareeni and Hamdan, 2020). In this sense, according to the agency theory, the board of directors mainly reduces the existing information asymmetries (Berrío-Zapata *et al.*, 2021). Arif *et al.* (2020) point out these information asymmetries are reduced through efficient accountability processes, and therefore, the corporate report also becomes a control instrument for agency problems.

On the other hand, the board of directors plays a fundamental role in controlling that the actions of the managers do not diverge from the interests of the shareholders. According to Younas *et al.* (2021), this function one of the most important because it reduces the main agency problem. Therefore, the existence of a board of directors implies that the manager must be permanently accountable and potential situations in which the interests of the shareholders are being violated can be warned early (Wang *et al.*, 2020).

The board of directors has been referenced by Reguera-alvarado and Bravo (2017) as the highest representation of senior management in an organization. It is the board's responsibility to carry out the controls required to mitigate conflict between managers and investors' interests (Li *et al.*, 2018). In this sense, Correa-García *et al.* (2020) and Bacha and Ajina (2019) have indicated board size is a crucial factor in improving accountability: the more participants the board has, the greater the information requirements the organization must supply. Thus, *H2* is put forward:

H2. Board size positively influences CRQ.

Furthermore, the composition of the board of directors has been studied by authors such as Ullah *et al.* (2020) and Torres-Cano and Correa-Mejía (2021) because the board of directors plays an essential role in reducing agency problems. The most common aspect that is considered when evaluating the composition of the board of directors is gender diversity (Khan *et al.*, 2019). The evaluation of this aspect is based on the upper echelons theory developed by Hambrick and Mason (1984). According to this theory, cognitive and physical factors (such as a person's gender) directly influence decision-making and problem-solving (Zaid *et al.*, 2020). According to Martinez-Jimenez *et al.* (2020), the boards of directors with gender diversity have different approaches that allow them to approach problems from different perspectives, which allow finding better solutions.

Moreover, upper echelons theory points out that both men and women have different communication processes (Issa *et al.*, 2021) because gender influences the aspects emphasized when communicating ideas. In this way, Ullah *et al.* (2020) suggest that diverse boards of directors are more likely to improve the communication processes with their stakeholders because communication is more assertive (Khan *et al.*, 2019). In this context, diverse boards of directors reduce information asymmetries and improve communication between companies and stakeholders (Nielsen and Huse, 2010).

Authors including Rose (2007) and Uribe-Bohorquez *et al.* (2018) have delved deeper into boards of directors, arguing that gender diversity among board members is a fundamental factor for having different points of view in decision-making. Adams and Ferreira (2009) found a positive relationship between women's inclusion in the board of directors and financial information quality, which is mainly because of the fact that gender diversity fuels discussions and allows larger scenarios to be considered under different circumstances (Nielsen and Huse, 2010). In this light, *H3* is proposed:

H3. Gender diversity has a positive impact on CRQ.

According to the stakeholder theory developed by Freeman (1984), companies must develop their corporate strategy thinking of satisfying the interests of the shareholders and the demands of the stakeholders (Fahad and Busru, 2020). The fact that CG has a committee in charge of sustainability and social responsibility issues shows the companies' commitment to consider stakeholders within the company's global strategy (Chevrollier *et al.*, 2020).

Elmaghrabi (2021) points out that the sustainability committee promotes a balance between the expectations that stakeholders maintain and corporate expectations and provides a balance between financial and nonfinancial goals. Additionally, the probability that communication between the company and its stakeholders is two-way increases when there is a sustainability committee (Mohamed-Adnan *et al.*, 2018), allowing the boards of directors to consider stakeholders' positions within the company strategy.

Hussain *et al.* (2018) claim the accountability process is enhanced by the existence of a sustainability committee within the CG structure. That committee oversees the guiding of the firm's sustainability strategy (Kuzey and Uyar, 2017) and generates information concerning social, environmental and economic impacts (Dissanayake *et al.*, 2016). As such, the sustainability committee is primarily entrusted with generating nonfinancial information to the stakeholders, resulting in an improvement to the quality of the information reported. This leads to *H4*:

H4. The existence of a sustainability committee has a positive impact on CRQ.

Finally, the institutional theory worked by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) indicates that the behavior of organizations is influenced by external factors that cause companies in specific contexts to have similar actions (Aluchna *et al.*, 2020). Studies such as Vitolla *et al.* (2020) have stated that companies have different accountability practices according to the institutional context in which they operate.

Uribe-Bohorquez *et al.* (2018) identified that one of the most influential institutional aspects of organizational behavior is related to the regulation of a country. Countries with adequate regulations promote better behaviors of both citizens and corporations. In this sense, country regulations directly affect the organizational accountability process (Garcia-Sanchez *et al.*, 2016).

Regarding the gap in the literature identified by Uribe-Bohorquez *et al.* (2018), the institutional effect on CRQ was examined via the quality of national regulation in the multilatinas' country of origin. Garcia-Sanchez *et al.* (2016) state that governments have the necessary mechanisms to persuade and force firms to publish certain information. Previous studies such as by Holland and Foo (2003) have found that a country's institutional strength has a positive impact on firms' disclosures of nonfinancial aspects. Therefore, *H5* is proposed:

H5. The quality of national regulation has a positive impact on CRQ.

Figure 1 summarizes the proposed hypotheses.

3. Methodology

3.1 Sample

The ranking of the 100 multilatinas published by the journal América Economía (2018) served as the basis for the development of this study. This ranking identifies the most important multilatinas in the region and includes companies from Brazil, Mexico, Chile,

Figure 1 Research layout



Argentina, Colombia and Panama. The reports published by the 100 companies during the period 2014–2020 were reviewed, excluding those that did not contain the necessary information for the purposes of this study. After screening the initial sample, a total of 77 multilatinas were studied as per Table 1 below, which shows the sample composition by country and year.

According to Table 1, Brazil and Mexico are the countries with the most multilatinas, accounting for 37% and 30%, respectively. These two countries have the region's largest economies, allowing their companies to expand beyond their borders (Aguilera *et al.*, 2017). The companies in the sample are grouped into nine industries as shown in Table 2, based on the classification used by the journal América Economía (2018).

Bloomberg was used to obtain financial and CG information, whereas information on the type of corporate report was extracted from each published report.

3.2 Variables

3.2.1 Dependent variable. CRQ is the dependent variable of this study, defined in accordance with the types of reports identified by Correa-García *et al.* (2018) and measured on a scale of (1)–(4), with (4) being the highest quality report and (1) being the lowest. CRQ takes the value of (1) with the publishing of an AR, (2) with an SR, (3) with a CR and (4) with an IR. Davila *et al.* (2018) and Havlová (2015) analyzed the characteristics of each report and, based on financial and nonfinancial disclosures, classified the IR as the highest quality report because it considers different company dimensions and the AR as the lowest quality report because it focuses primarily on financial information.

Table 1 Composition of the sample by country and year

Year	*Brazil*	*Mexico*	*Chile*	*Colombia*	*Argentina*	*Panama*	*Total*
2014	27	24	12	7	5	2	77
2015	27	23	12	7	5	2	76
2016	27	23	12	7	5	2	76
2017	27	22	12	7	5	2	75
2018	27	22	12	7	5	2	75
2019	25	18	12	6	1	1	63
2020	25	18	12	4	1	1	61
Total	185	150	84	45	27	12	503

Table 2 Composition of the sample by industry

Industry	*Amount*	*Frequency*
Industrial	20	0.26
Food and beverages	18	0.23
Energy	9	0.12
Aeronautics	6	0.08
Technology	6	0.08
Chemical	5	0.06
Mining	5	0.06
Finance	4	0.05
Retail	4	0.05
Total	77	1.00

3.2.2 Interest and control variables. This study used CG variables of various multilatinas obtained from Bloomberg and used the World Bank's measurement of regulatory quality, as well as control variables related to each multilatina's financial situation.

Initially, the governance index of each multilatina is considered, and the index is calculated by Bloomberg which, in accordance with Li *et al.* (2018), measures the quality of CG through disclosures made by companies through their reports on aspects such as board structure, diversity, number of meetings per year and committees, among others. The index ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest level of CG.

The main characteristics of the board, such as size, diversity and the existence of a sustainability committee or similar body, were also considered among the variables evaluated on CG (Kachouri and Jarboui, 2017). These variables have an impact on financial and nonfinancial disclosure policies and thus on CRQ (Khan *et al.*, 2013). The number of people on the board is used to determine board size. Diversity refers to the level of inclusion of women in senior management decisions (Adams and Ferreira, 2009); this variable was measured based on the number of women on each multilatina's board of directors. The existence of a sustainability committee within the CG structure of the multilatinas was evaluated as a dichotomous variable, assigning a value of 1 if the company has such a committee and a value of 0 otherwise.

To reflect the institutional context in which each multilatina's parent company is located, the legal framework of each country was considered because agency problems between principals and agents can be mitigated through countries' regulatory quality, as argued by Uribe-Bohorquez *et al.* (2018). The regulatory quality index (World Bank, 2020) was used to assess institutional strength; it measures the existence in a country of policies promoting the adequate development of the private sector and ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest).

To avoid bias in the results, control variables from previous studies were used (Cavaco *et al.*, 2017). Multilatinas' size was measured as the natural logarithm of total assets as by Feng *et al.* (2015); leverage was chosen as control variable (Sethi *et al.*, 2017), calculated as total liabilities/equity; and dichotomous variables were used to control for year, industry and country.

3.3 Model

The panel data model was applied as in Duque-Grisales and Aguilera-Caracuel's (2019) study to test the hypotheses, allowing to evaluate the 77 multilatinas during the period 2014–2020. The estimated model is specified in the equation below:

$$CRQ = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GovInd_{it} + \beta_2 Board\_size_{it} + \beta_3 Div_{it} + \beta_4 Sust\_com_{it} + \beta_5 Reg\_quality_{it} + \beta_6 Size_{it} + \beta_7 Leverage_{it} + \sum_{1}^{9} Industry + \sum_{10}^{15} Country + \sum_{16}^{22} Year + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where CRQ denotes the quality of the corporate report, GovInd represents the governance index, Board_size is board size, Div is board diversity, Sust_com refers to the existence of a sustainability committee, Reg_quality represents regulatory quality, Size is firm size, Leverage is leveraging, *i* represents each multilatina, *t* is the year, ε is the error term and $\beta_1, \beta_2 \ldots \beta_7$ are the coefficients serving to estimate the effects of each variable on CRQ.

4. Results

4.1 Descriptive analysis

Table 3 exhibits the descriptive statistics results, with a governance index average of 45.72, indicating a low level of governance practices in the multilatinas. Boards are composed of ten people on average, but do not have much diversity as they include about one woman on average and three in the highest case. In turn, the average regulatory quality is 53.50, showing that multilatinas' institutional context is not inclined to have strong policies promoting adequate private sector development. However, this variable has a high standard deviation, revealing that institutional policies vary greatly across countries.

In total, 73% of the firms include an SR in their corporate reporting. Despite the tendency to report on nonfinancial issues, it is clear that the IR has not been well received in the Latin American context, with only 15% of multilatinas using it as a means of reporting. Notwithstanding a strong preference for using SRs in corporate reporting, only 24% of the firms have a sustainability committee to guide corporate strategy in this area. Finally, because multilatinas are more likely to issue sustainability reporting, the GRI variable was also examined to generate a robustness analysis. Of the total number of firms considered in this study, 55 (11%) present their SRs under the comprehensive option, 271 (54%) publish them under the core option, 35 (7%) prepare SRs mentioning that they do so in accordance with the GRI guidelines and 142 (28%) do not present SRs.

The correlational analysis between the variables considered in this study is shown in Table 4.

The board independence (ind) variable was considered to carry out this study; however, because of its high correlation with board size (0.793), multicollinearity issues arose

Table 3 Descriptive analysis

Variable	*Obs.*	*Median*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*
GovInd	503	48.21	45.72	11.02	6	71.43
Board_size	503	9	10	3.57	4	21
Div	503	1	1	0.97	0	4
Reg_quality	503	51.44	53.50	20.32	12.50	91.83
Size	503	8.9	8.83	1.25	5.01	12.98
Leverage	503	1.47	5.35	63.31	−47.98	166.50
Variable	Obs.			Frequency		
		0	1	2	3	4
CRQ	503	0	138	181	108	76
	1	0	0.27	0.36	0.21	0.15
GRI	503	142	35	271	55	0
	1	0.28	0.07	0.54	0.11	0
Sust_com	503	380	123	0	0	0
	1	0.76	0.24	0	0	0

Table 4 Correlation matrix								
Variable	*CRQ*	*GovInd*	*Sust_com*	*Board_size*	*Div*	*Reg_quality*	*Size*	*Leverage*
CRQ	1							
GovInd	0.295***	1						
Sust_com	0.36***	0.165***	1					
Board_size	0.1**	−0.065	0.049	1				
Div	0.29***	0.174***	0.146***	0.236***	1			
Reg_quality	0.232***	−0.001	0.061	−0.262***	−0.004	1		
Size	0.141**	0.313***	0.082*	0.281***	0.037	−0.024	1	
Leverage	0.026	0.053	−0.028	0.011	−0.029	0.019	0.013	1

Notes: Significance codes: $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

(Ducassy and Guyot, 2017). Following the variance inflation factor analysis performed by Khan *et al.* (2013), the independence variable was removed as it was biasing the model estimation.

4.2 Multivariate analysis

Table 5 displays the estimation results of the previously described model. Regressions were run for each variable of interest to test the hypotheses and the model was estimated considering the interaction of all the variables. The results for each model were controlled for industry, country and year.

4.3 Robustness check

To generate robustness on the results obtained by Models 1–6, new models were estimated with the level of GRI application as the dependent variable, in agreement with previous studies such as by Correa-García *et al.* (2020) and Hussain *et al.* (2018), which use the level of GRI application as a proxy to assess CRQ. The GRI standards are widely accepted by

Table 5 Empirical results for CRQ						
Variable	*Model 1 Estimate (std. error)*	*Model 2 Estimate (std. error)*	*Model 3 Estimate (std. error)*	*Model 4 Estimate (std. error)*	*Model 5 Estimate (std. error)*	*Model 6 Estimate (std. error)*
(Intercept)	−2.017**	−1.967**	−1.654*	−1.816*	−1.588*	−2.494**
	0.691	0.754	0.796	0.842	0.743	0.816
GovInd	1.389***					1.131**
	0.399					0.416
Board_size		0.793*				0.725.
		0.361				0.398
Sust_com			0.511***			0.367**
			0.136			0.139
Div				0.884***		0.528*
				0.226		0.243
Reg_quality	0.757**	0.858**	0.671*	0.711**	0.724**	0.828**
	0.268	0.266	0.263	0.262	0.261	0.276
Size	0.266	0.593	0.746.	0.867*	0.853*	0.139
	0.439	0.438	0.427	0.421	0.417	0.471
Leverage	−0.099	−0.055	−0.051	−0.187	−0.043	−0.214
	1.514	1.641	1.798	1.908	1.67	1.745
Industry	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled
Country	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled
Year	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled

Notes: Significance codes: $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

companies globally (Moratis and Brandt, 2017) and multilatinas are no exception, with 72% adopting the GRI guidelines for sustainability reporting to some extent, as shown in Table 3. The GRI variable takes a value of 3 if the company prepares its SR under the comprehensive option, 2 if the report is prepared under the core option, 1 if it presents an SR that follows the GRI guidelines and 0 otherwise. The following equation presents the estimation of the models using the GRI as dependent variable.

$$GRI = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GovInd_{it} + \beta_2 Board\_size_{it} + \beta_3 Div_{it} + \beta_4 Sust\_com_{it} + \beta_5 Reg\_quality_{it} + \beta_6 Size_{it} + \beta_7 Leverage_{it} + \sum_{1}^{9} Industry + \sum_{10}^{15} Country + \sum_{16}^{22} Year + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Table 6 presents the estimations of each model to test the hypotheses, with GRI as dependent variable.

5. Discussion

The empirical results shown in Table 5 are used to test the hypotheses proposed. Through the estimation of Model 1, it is observed that the governance index has a positive impact (β = 1.389, p-value $<$ 0.01) on multilatinas' CRQ, thus supporting *H1*. This result indicates that multilatinas' good practices in structuring their CG are reflected in a better accountability process via corporate reporting and is consistent with Duque-Grisales and Aguilera-Caracuel (2019), who establish that proper CG structuring and the separation of functions through specialized board committees reduce information asymmetry and thus companies tend to disclose their financial and nonfinancial information in a more comprehensive manner.

According to Model 2, *H2* is fulfilled because board size influences multilatinas' CRQ positively (β = 0.793, p-value $<$ 0.05), a finding consistent with Correa-García *et al.* (2020) and Bacha and Ajina (2019), who state that the number of people on the board enriches a firm's discussions and course of action. According to Bacha and Ajina (2019), the greater the number of board members, the greater the disclosure requirements, resulting in better corporate reporting. Cuadrado-Ballesteros *et al.* (2017), on the other hand, demonstrated that boards with a large number of participants can reach a point of inefficiency in decision-making. Correa-García *et al.* (2020) explain this as the effect of an inverted parabola, because decision quality and timeliness may decline after a certain number of managers. This position was considered in this study, but when working with the variable $(TJD_{it})^2$, similar results were obtained, indicating that board size is positive and statistically significant. This is a consistent result because multilatinas do not have oversized boards of directors, as shown in Table 3.

Furthermore, when gender diversity is examined, it is found that diversity has a positive impact (β = 0.884, p-value $<$ 0.01) on CRQ. Model 4 estimation results confirm *H4*. According to Nielsen and Huse (2010), it is not only the number of board members that helps to increase the number of criteria but the diversity of positions is also related to the inclusion of women in the discussions. Women, on the other hand, have historically been relegated and not considered for decision-making in Latin America (Flabbi *et al.*, 2017). Table 3 confirms that, in fact, multilatinas have on average one woman on their boards. According to the findings, having a female perspective in board discussions positively impacts the quality of corporate reporting.

The estimation of Model 3 supports *H4*. The existence of a sustainability committee has a positive impact (β = 0.511, p-value $<$ 0.01) on CRQ and demonstrates the effort to manage stakeholder expectations (Hussain *et al.*, 2018). Because corporate reports are the primary means of communicating sustainability issues (Correa-García *et al.*, 2018), the existence of such a committee within multilatinas enables the generation of nonfinancial information on economic, environmental and social aspects, thus enhancing CRQ (Hussain *et al.*, 2018).

Model 6 estimates the joint effect of all the CG variables on multilatinas' CRQ, corroborating what was established in the estimation of the previous models and thus supporting the hypotheses advanced in this study. These findings indicate that multilatinas with high governance indices, with a higher number of participants and greater diversity on their boards and with a sustainability committee produce higher-quality corporate reports and therefore have a better accountability process.

H5 is supported through the estimation of Models 1–6. Regulatory quality has a positive effect on CRQ because this variable is significant in all models with a coefficient greater than zero. This result is in line with Uribe-Bohorquez *et al.* (2018), who argue that countries with a high level of enforcement make companies more transparent and therefore provide clearer information to the public (Garcia-Sanchez *et al.*, 2016).

The results from Table 6 reinforce the previous analyses. In this case, the governance index has a positive influence (β = 1.504, *p*-value < 0.01) for the SR to be prepared with the highest standards, which is consistent with Model 1 and supports what was stated in *H1*. Board size also has a positive impact (β = 0.7, *p*-value < 0.1) on the quality of the SR, which corroborates *H2*.

Through the estimation of Models 10 and 12, it is observed that board diversity has a positive coefficient (β = 0.631 and β = 0.221, respectively), but this impact is not statistically significant (*p*-value > 0.1 for Model 12). With these results, it is not possible to assert that the inclusion of women on boards has an effect on the quality of sustainability reporting and therefore it is not possible to generate robust results on *H4*. Model 8, on the other hand, confirms *H4*. In this case, the existence of a sustainability committee implies higher quality (β = 0.548, *p*-value < 0.01) in multilatinas' sustainability reporting. Model 12 largely supports the hypotheses of this study because the results obtained are consistent with those of Model 6 with the exception of the impact of board diversity. Finally, *H5* is confirmed in the estimation of Models 7–12. These results are consistent with the ones

Table 6 Empirical results for GRI

Variable	*Model 7 Estimate (std. error)*	*Model 8 Estimate (std. error)*	*Model 9 Estimate (std. error)*	*Model 10 Estimate (std. error)*	*Model 11 Estimate (std. error)*	*Model 12 Estimate (std. error)*
(Intercept)	−1.850**	−1.688*	−1.370.	−1.451	−1.344.	−2.281**
	0.691	0.762	0.8	0.804	0.746	0.787
GovInd	1.504***					1.345**
	0.398					0.415
Board_size		0.7.				0.784*
		0.358				0.395
Sust_com			0.548***			0.429**
			0.135			0.138
Div				0.631**		0.221
				0.223		0.241
Reg_quality	0.645*	0.737**	0.556*	0.603*	0.616*	0.724**
	0.268	0.266	0.263	0.261	0.26	0.276
Size	0.418	0.845.	0.968*	1.093**	1.074**	0.243
	0.437	0.435	0.425	0.417	0.415	0.468
Leverage	−0.661	−0.718	−0.856	−0.956	−0.731	−0.844
	1.523	1.672	1.823	1.834	1.691	1.675
Industry	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled
Country	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled
Year	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled	Controlled

Notes: Significance codes: *$p < 0.1$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$

initially obtained, indicating that regulatory quality has a positive impact on the CRQ of multilatinas.

6. Conclusions

The aim of this study was to identify the impacts of CG and institutional context on the CRQ of multilatinas. Through empirical results, CG has been demonstrated to be a mechanism that positively impacts the accountability process in the Latin American context. This result has been obtained by evaluating the governance index, board size, board diversity and the existence of a sustainability committee and its impact on CRQ. The empirical evidence obtained is key to the Latin American context as it provides elements for discussion concerning the reduction of information asymmetries, thanks to appropriate CG structuring. Moreover, this work provides empirical evidence indicating Latin American countries' regulatory quality has a positive impact on CRQ.

This research provides empirical support to what is proposed by agency and stakeholder theory regarding the role of CG and institutional context in reducing information asymmetries and improving accountability processes to all stakeholders in the Latin American context. The appropriate structure of the CG allows for better accountability processes to exist through higher-quality corporate reports, even in developing economies such as Latin America. Additionally, the finding on the impact of the institutional context on the CRC is noteworthy as Latin America has notoriously stood out worldwide because of its corruption scandals (Sáenz-González and García-Meca, 2014). In this way, multilatinas showcase better corporate reporting practices in those countries where regulation is of high quality, resulting in more information that satisfies stakeholders' expectations and hence reducing corruption risks (Garcia-Sanchez *et al.*, 2016).

This study has implications for those responsible for preparing corporate reports because they must be aware of the new financial and nonfinancial information standards that should be published to satisfy stakeholders' expectations. Likewise, there are implications for countries' regulation to be strengthened so that there is greater transparency in the private sector, thus creating a mechanism to reduce corruption. Finally, companies' highest bodies must be careful when setting up their CG to reduce agency problems and provide information pertaining to their financial and nonfinancial dimensions.

The results of this study are limited to the largest multilatinas in the region, the ones that have the most resources to invest in nonfinancial aspects and the greatest resources to produce reports that include this information. Furthermore, these companies are more exposed to governments' regulatory mechanisms than smaller companies. Results may thus vary if research is performed on small- and medium-sized Latin American companies. For conducting this study, it was necessary to collect, from different databases, information relating to multilatinas' financial, CG and institutional aspects as no single database compiling this information is available. This limitation was overcome by resorting to databases in addition to consulting corporate reports directly. However, the sample size was reduced because not all multilatinas' information was available. Performing a sectoral analysis is suggested as a future line of research because additional results could be obtained depending on industry particularities. Also, given the socioeconomic characteristics that render the Latin American context a peculiar environment, it is suggested, based on the literature review, that research examining the moderating effects of multilatinas' expansion and their shareholding composition should be conducted.

References

Adams, R. and Ferreira, D. (2009), "Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance", *Journal of Financial Economics*, Vol. 94 No. 2, pp. 291-309, doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.007.

Aguilera, R., Ciravegna, L., Cuervo-Cazurra, A. and González-Pérez, M. (2017), "Multilatinas and the internationalization of Latin American firms", *Journal of World Business*, Vol. 52 No. 4, pp. 447-460, doi: 10.1016/j.jwb.2017.05.006.

Akbar, S., Poletti-Hughes, J., El-Faitouri, R. and Shah, S. (2016), "More on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the UK: evidence from the application of generalized method of moments estimation", *Research in International Business and Finance*, Vol. 38, pp. 417-429, doi: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.03.009.

Alareeni, B. and Hamdan, A. (2020), "ESG impact on performance of US S&P 500-listed firms", *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 20 No. 7, pp. 1409-1428.

Aluchna, M., Kamiński, B. and Mahadeo, B. (2020), "The association between independent directors and company value. Confronting evidence from two emerging markets", corporate governance", *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 20 No. 6, pp. 987-999.

América Economía (2018), "Ranking multilatinas 2018", available at: https://rankings.americaeconomia.com/ (accessed 20 June 2020).

Arif, M., Sajjad, A., Farooq, S., Abrar, M. and Joyo, A. (2020), "The impact of audit committee attributes on the quality and quantity of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosures", *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 497-514.

Bacha, S. and Ajina, A. (2019), "CSR performance and annual report readability: evidence from France", *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 201-215.

Berrío-Zapata, D., López-Caicedo, E., David-Higuita, S. and Correa-Mejía, D. (2021), "Características del reporte corporativo en latinoamérica: un análisis sectorial", *Revista Saber, Ciencia y Libertad*, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 172-198.

Castro-Olaya, J., Castro-Olaya, J. and González-Pérez, M. (2015), "Adaptation, adaptation and expedite creative adaptation: the internationalization patterns of multilatinas in the food industry", *Multidisciplinary Business Review*, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 25-48.

Cavaco, S., Crifo, P., Rebérioux, A. and Roudaut, G. (2017), "Independent directors: less informed but better selected than affiliated board members?", *Journal of Corporate Finance*, Vol. 43 No. 1, pp. 106-121.

Chevrollier, N., Zhang, J., van Leeuwen, T. and Nijhof, A. (2020), "The predictive value of strategic orientation for ESG performance over time", *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 123-142.

Chijoke-Mgbame, A.M., Mgbame, C., Akintoye, S. and Ohalehi, P. (2019), "The role of corporate governance on CSR disclosure and firm performance in a voluntary environment", *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 294-306.

Correa-García, J., Correa-Mejía, D. and Ceballos-García, D. (2021), "Prácticas de revelación en los reportes corporativos: características de las empresas colombianas", *Revista Dimensión Empresarial*, Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 91-114.

Correa-García, J., García-Benau, M. and Garcia-Meca, E. (2018), "CSR communication strategies of Colombian business groups: an analysis of corporate reports", *Sustainability*, Vol. 10 No. 5, pp. 1-19.

Correa-García, J., García-Benau, M. and García-Meca, E. (2020), "Corporate governance and its implications for sustainability reporting quality in Latin American business groups", *Journal of Cleaner Production*, Vol. 260 No. 1, pp. 121-142.

Correa-Mejía, D., Quintero-Castaño, J., Gómez-Orozco, S. and Castro-Castro, C. (2020), "El GC, un pilar indispensable Para el desempeño financiero", *Universidad and Empresa*, Vol. 38 No. 22, pp. 40-64.

Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B., García-Sánchez, I. and Martínez-Ferrero, J. (2017), "The impact of board structure on CSR practices on the international scale", *European Journal of International Management*, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 227-253.

Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2016), "Multilatinas as sources of new research insights: the learning and escape drivers of international expansion", *Journal of Business Research*, Vol. 69 No. 6, pp. 1963-1972.

Cuervo-Cazurra, A. and Ramamurti, R. (2014), *Understanding Multinationals from Emerging Markets*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.

Davila, A., Rodriguez-Lluesma, C. and Elvira, M. (2018), "Engaging stakeholders in emerging economies: the case of multilatinas", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 152 No. 4, pp. 949-964.

DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (1983), "The iron cage revisited: institutional iso- morphism and collective rationality in organizational fields", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 48 No. 2, pp. 147-160.

Dissanayake, D., Tilt, C. and Xydias-Lobo, M. (2016), "Sustainability reporting by publicly listed companies in Sri Lanka", *Journal of Cleaner Production*, Vol. 129 No. 1, pp. 169-182.

Ducassy, I. and Guyot, A. (2017), "Complex ownership structures, corporate governance and firm performance: the French context", *Research in International Business and Finance*, Vol. 39 No. 1, pp. 291-306.

Duque-Grisales, E. and Aguilera-Caracuel, J. (2019), "Environmental, social and governance (ESG) scores and financial performance of multilatinas: moderating effects of geographic international diversification and financial slack", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 168 No. 2, pp. 315-334.

Elmaghrabi, M. (2021), "CSR committee attributes and CSR performance: UK evidence", *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 21 No. 5, pp. 892-919.

Fahad, P. and Busru, S.A. (2020), "CSR disclosure and firm performance: evidence from an emerging market", *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 553-568.

Feng, Z., Wang, M. and Huang, H. (2015), "Equity financing and social responsibility: further international evidence", *The International Journal of Accounting*, Vol. 50 No. 3, pp. 247-280.

Fiaschi, D., Giuliani, E. and Nieri, F. (2017), "Overcoming the liability of origin by doing no-harm: emerging country firms' social irresponsibility as they go global", *Journal of World Business*, Vol. 52 No. 4, pp. 546-563.

Flabbi, L., Piras, C. and Abrahams, S. (2017), "Female corporate leadership in Latin America and the Caribbean region: representation and firm-level outcomes", *International Journal of Manpower*, Vol. 38 No. 6, pp. 790-818.

Freeman, R. (1984), *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.

Garcia-Sanchez, I., Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B. and Frias-Aceituno, J. (2016), "Impact of the institutional macro context on the voluntary disclosure of CSR information", *Long Range Planning*, Vol. 49 No. 1, pp. 15-35.

GRI (2016), "GRI 102: contenidos generales", available at: www.globalreporting.org/standards/media/1440/spanish-gri-102-general-disclosures-2016.pdf (accessed 27 July 2020).

Hambrick, D. and Mason, P. (1984), "Upper echelons: the organization as a reflection of its top managers", *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 193-206.

Havlová, K. (2015), "What integrated reporting changed: the case study of early adopters", *Procedia Economics and Finance*, Vol. 34 No. 15, pp. 231-237.

Holland, L. and Foo, Y. (2003), "Differences in environmental reporting practices in the UK and the US: the legal and regulatory context", *The British Accounting Review*, Vol. 35 No. 1, pp. 1-18.

Hussain, N., Rigoni, U. and Orij, R. (2018), "Corporate governance and sustainability performance: analysis of triple bottom line performance", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 149 No. 2, pp. 411-432.

IIRC (2013), "The international < IR > framework", available at: https://integratedreporting.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/13-12-08-THE-INTERNATIONAL-IR-FRAMEWORK-2-1.pdf (accessed 17 June 2020).

Issa, A., Yousef, H., Bakry, A., Hanaysha, J.R. and Sahyouni, A. (2021), "Does the board diversity impact bank performance in the MENA countries? A multilevel study", *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 21 No. 5, pp. 865-891.

Kachouri, M. and Jarboui, A. (2017), "Exploring the relation between corporate reporting and corporate governance effectiveness", *Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting*, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 347-366.

Khan, A., Badrul, M. and Siddiqui, J. (2013), "Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility disclosures: evidence from an emerging economy", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 114 No. 2, pp. 207-223.

Khan, I., Khan, I. and Senturk, I. (2019), "Board diversity and quality of CSR disclosure: evidence from Pakistan", *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 19 No. 6, pp. 1187-1203.

Kuzey, C. and Uyar, A. (2017), “Determinants of sustainability reporting and its impact on firm value: evidence from the emerging market of Turkey”, *Journal of Cleaner Production*, Vol. 143 No. 1, pp. 27-39.

Li, Y., Gong, M., Zhang, X. and Koh, L. (2018), “The impact of environmental, social, and governance disclosure on firm value: the role of CEO power”, *The British Accounting Review*, Vol. 50 No. 1, pp. 60-75.

Lopez-Morales, J. (2018), “Multilatinas: a systematic literature review”, *Review of International Business and Strategy*, Vol. 28 Nos 3/4, pp. 331-357.

Macias, H.A. and Farfan-Lievano, A. (2017), “Integrated reporting as a strategy for firm growth: multiple case study in Colombia”, *Meditari Accountancy Research*, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 605-628.

Martinez-Jimenez, R., Hernández-Ortiz, M.J. and Cabrera Fernández, A.I. (2020), “Gender diversity influence on board effectiveness and business performance”, *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 307-323.

Mio, C. (2020), “Integrated reporting: the state of the art of corporate reporting”, *Revista Contabilidade & Finanças*, Vol. 31 No. 83, pp. 207-211.

Mohamed-Adnan, S., Hay, D. and van Staden, C. (2018), “The influence of culture and corporate governance on corporate social responsibility disclosure: a cross country analysis”, *Journal of Cleaner Production*, Vol. 198 No. 1, pp. 820-832.

Moratis, L. and Brandt, S. (2017), “Corporate stakeholder responsiveness? Exploring the state and quality of GRI-based stakeholder engagement disclosures of European firms”, *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 312-325.

Nielsen, S. and Huse, M. (2010), “The contribution of women on boards of directors: going beyond the surface”, *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 136-148.

Oino, I. (2019), “Do disclosure and transparency affect bank’s financial performance?”, corporate governance”, *The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 19 No. 6, pp. 1344-1361.

Reguera-Alvarado, N. and Bravo, F. (2017), “The effect of independent directors’ characteristics on firm performance: tenure and multiple directorships”, *Research in International Business and Finance*, Vol. 41 No. 1, pp. 590-599.

Rivera-Arrubla, Y., Zorio-Grima, A. and García-Benau, M. (2016), “El concepto de informe integrado como innovación en reporting corporativo”, *Journal of Innovation & Knowledge*, Vol. 1 No. 3, pp. 144-155.

Rose, C. (2007), “Does female board representation influence firm performance? The Danish evidence”, *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 404-413.

Sáenz-González, J. and García-Meca, E. (2014), “Does corporate governance influence earnings management in Latin American markets?”, *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 121 No. 3, pp. 419-440.

Said, R., Hj Zainuddin, Y. and Haron, H. (2009), “The relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate governance characteristics in Malaysian public listed companies”, *Social Responsibility Journal*, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 212-226.

Samet, M. and Jarboui, A. (2017), “How does corporate social responsibility contribute to investment efficiency?”, *Journal of Multinational Financial Management*, Vol. 40 No. 1, pp. 33-46.

Sethi, P., Martell, T. and Demir, M. (2017), “An evaluation of the quality of corporate social responsibility reports by some of the world’s largest financial institutions”, *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 140 No. 4, pp. 787-805.

Siagian, F., Siregar, S.V. and Rahadian, Y. (2013), “Corporate governance, reporting quality, and firm value: evidence from Indonesia”, *Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies*, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 4-20.

Stolowy, H. and Paugam, L. (2018), “The expansion of non-financial reporting: an exploratory study”, *Accounting and Business Research*, Vol. 48 No. 5, pp. 525-548.

Torres-Cano, S. and Correa-Mejía, D. (2021), “Impacto del gobierno corporativo en el valor de las empresas latinoamericanas: evidencia desde el Mila”, *Suma de Negocios*, Vol. 12 No. 26, pp. 73-82.

Ullah, I., Fang, H. and Jebran, K. (2020), “Do gender diversity and CEO gender enhance firm’s value? Evidence from an emerging economy”, *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 44-66.

Uribe-Bohorquez, M., Martínez-Ferrero, J. and García-Sánchez, I. (2018), “Board independence and firm performance: the moderating effect of institutional context”, *Journal of Business Research*, Vol. 88 No. 1, pp. 28-43.

Venturelli, A., Cosma, S. and Leopizzi, R. (2018), “Stakeholder engagement: an evaluation of European banks”, *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, Vol. 1.

Vitolla, F., Raimo, N., Rubino, M. and Garzoni, A. (2020), “The determinants of integrated reporting quality in financial institutions”, *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 429-444.

Wang, Y., Abbasi, K., Babajide, B. and Yekini, K. (2020), “Corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance: evidence from the emerging market following the revised CG code”, *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 158-174.

World Bank (2020), “Worldwide governance indicators”, available at: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (accessed 20 June 2021).

Younas, N., UdDin, S., Awan, T. and Khan, M.Y. (2021), “Corporate governance and financial distress: Asian emerging market perspective”, *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 702-715.

Zaid, M., Wang, M., Abuhijleh, S., Issa, A., Saleh, M. and Ali, F. (2020), “Corporate governance practices and capital structure decisions: the moderating effect of gender diversity”, *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, Vol. 20 No. 5, pp. 939-964.

Corresponding author

Diego Andrés Correa-Mejía can be contacted at: diegoa.correa@udea.edu.co