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A semiosic translation of the term "*Bild*" in both the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *The Philosophical Investigations*

Abstract: This paper introduces and defends a way to translate Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* from a semiotic standpoint. This turn builds on *Semiosic Translation* (Torres-Martínez 2015, Semiosic translation: A new theoretical framework for the implementation of pedagogically-oriented subtitling. *Sign Systems Studies* 43(1). 102–130), a framework that advances the interaction of sign systems as a necessary point of departure in the translation process. From this vantage, the key term "*Bild*," is analyzed, explained and retranslated into English. This term evinces high levels of complexity and variability that cannot be captured by traditional linguistic translations. In applying a semiotic approach, any iteration of *Bild* is characterized as reflecting the author's intentions at a given moment (*PI*: 108). This semiotic reading seeks to provide semioticians, translators, and philosophers with new conceptual tools leading to an understanding of translation as a systemic operation not confined to the realm of subjective interpretation.

Keywords: *Philosophical Investigations*, philosophical translation, semiosic *translation*, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein, mapping-picture

1 Introduction

This essay focuses on the semiosic translation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* in the context of *Semiosic Translation* (Torres-Martínez 2015), a framework that advances the study of translation as an operation occurring across different sign systems. No attempt is made, however, to postulate semiotics as a catch-all *solvent for philosophy*. Rather, it is my intention to investigate the extent to which Wittgenstein's reflections (using the term *Bild* as a point of departure) in two of his major works, can be given a non-linguistic treatment. To that end, the updated version of *semiosic translation* presented in this paper is construed as

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(a) the product of the interaction of highly complex variables working within a sign system, which, in this paper, will be understood as Wittgenstein's "*Gedankengebiet.*" In defining Wittgenstein's thinking as a distinct sign system, I acknowledge that this particular form of semiosis exhibits both high-level and low-level properties that are recognizable as stemming from the semiotic interactions occurring within the system itself. Fittingly, then, the translational problem posed throughout this paper consists in "considering the system as its own little world with its own rules ..." (Brodu 2009: 57). On this understanding, the semiotic autonomy of the system's elements, i.e., the dynamics of interaction between all types of signs within the system, is construed as a set of associative patterns between signs in the form of a *logical-tree metaphor* (Bazzocchi 2010); (b) the upshot of describing such patterns this way is fleshed out in terms of the association of functions to the smallest components of the system, whereby signs are mobilized through recursive iterations; (c) in order to determine the viability of the translational process, a two-way mechanism of control must be in place. Such mechanism combines the semiotic variability inherent to semiosis with the systemic identity resulting from the completion of the translation process; finally, (d) the semiotic transfer of information between the constituents of the sign system takes place through the action of individual signs acting as hubs that connect various parts of experience within the system.

This account is in keeping with an analysis of Wittgenstein's use of the term *"Bild,"* the translation of which reveals a gap between established translations and the author's characterization of this concept in both the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. One of the reasons the well-established English translation of *Bild* ("picture") plays fast and loose with Wittgenstein's intended use in different contexts is the lack of insight into the way terminological variety translates itself into conceptual instances available to readers outside the text. I shall explain this claim and then say what I take to be the best translational approach.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I outline Wittgenstein's semiotics. Section 3 offers the tenets of semiosic translation from the perspective of Wittgenstein's *rule-following paradox* (for the construction of a non-deterministic sign system), as the formal theoretical foundation of a translational approach to philosophical translation. Finally in Section 4, I advance a semiosic translation of the term "*Bild*" both in the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*. It is claimed that the various uses of this term in Wittgenstein's works respond to the laws of complex systems which reveal the ubiquity and randomness of semiotic interactions within sign systems. Essentially then, the substrate to the system becomes its *identity*. Such identity is conditioned by variables such as *interpretation* and *purpose*.

2 Wittgenstein's semiotics

The early Wittgenstein's view of sign in the *Tractatus* can be roughly defined as "what can be perceived of a symbol" (*TLP*: 3.32). This means that the symbol-meaning relationship (a sign and a meaning mediated by a formal identity) ushered through the *Tractatus* is dyadic and isomorphic. Thus, for the early Wittgenstein, symbols are contingently associated with specific meanings that, however, are not part of the symbols' identity but of particular modes of signification (*Bezeichnungweise*)[1]:

> Es kann nie das gemeinsame Merkmal zweier Gegenstände anzeigen, daß wir sie mit demselben Zeichen, aber durch zwei verschiedene *Bezeichnungsweisen* bezeichnen. Denn das Zeichen ist ja willkürlich. Man könnte also auch zwei verschiedene Zeichen wählen, und wo bliebe dann das Gemeinsame in der Bezeichnung? (*TLP*: 3.322)
>
> ['Using the same sign to signify two different objects can never be interpreted as a common characteristic of the two, but simply as two different *modes of signification*. For signs are arbitrary. One could therefore choose two different signs instead but, what would be left in common in terms of signification?']

These features are not contingent, though. As McGinn (2010: 210) points out "the features of the world that are isomorphically mirrored in a language which represents it cannot be described in language. The features are not contingent and a description of them would fail to accord with the bi-polarity requirement, which Wittgenstein places on propositions with sense." Thus, Wittgenstein's view of sign can be summarized as follows: A sign is a physical realization of a symbol (the sum of form and content). Moreover, in doing philosophy, a symbol must be used in accordance with a *mode of signification* (certain rules of logical syntax, cf. *TLP*: 3.325).

As already noted, a symbol is not associated with specific meanings ("das Zeichen ist ja willkürlich"). As Diamond (2015: 83) points out, "a sign taken together with one mode of employment constitutes one symbol, and the same sign, taken with some other mode of employment, would constitute a different symbol." The most important type of symbol is the proposition which is capable of representing a state of affairs:

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1 Translation mine here and throughout. The works of Ludwig Wittgenstein are referred to with capital-letter abbreviations followed by the number of the remark: *Philosophical Investigations (PI), Philosophy of Psychology (PP)*, and *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP)*.

Jeden Teil des Satzes, der seinen Sinn charakterisiert, nenne ich einen Ausdruck (ein Symbol).

(Der Satz selbst ist ein Ausdruck.)

Ausdruck ist alles, für den Sinn des Satzes Wesentliche, was Sätze miteinander gemein haben können.

Der Ausdruckkennzeichneteine Form und einen Inhalt. (*TLP*: 3.31)

['Every part of a proposition, which characterizes its sense, is what I call an expression (a symbol) (the proposition is itself an expression.)

An expression is everything (essential to the sense of a proposition) which propositions can share. Expressions characterize form and content.']

Propositions are mirror-like pictures of sense (the *Tractarian* characterization of sign is summarized in Figure 1). Hence, "Language is the totality of propositions" (Die Gesamtheit der Sätze ist die Sprache; *TLP*: 4.001).


Figure 1: The model of sign in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

Wittgenstein's dyadic view of sign and symbol in the *Tractatus* (whereby a sentence has one interpretation only) shifts to a triadic characterization that links sign, meaning, and use in the *Philosophical Investigations* (sentences have here a different interpretation in different situations). This is explicit in *PI*: 432: "Jedes Zeichen scheint *allein* tot. *Was* gibt ihm leben? – Im Gebrauch *lebt* es. Hat es da den lebenden Atem in sich? – Oder ist der Gebrauch sein Atem?" ('Every sign seems dead by itself. *What* gives it life? – In use it is *alive*. Is life infused into it there? – Or is use its life?').

Although this is a *rhetorical question*, the purpose is unambiguous: It seeks to position meaning as part of certain usages. It should be noted, however, that this remark is connected with *PI*: 43, where Wittgenstein explicitly states that the meaning of a word "can be *explained* as its use in the language." The point to be made is that the USE invoked in *PI*: 43 is not purely individual but entrenched in a community of users.

This characterization of *meaning-as-use* paves the way to a more comprehensive conceptualization of language games as a system of propositions that is meaningful only in specific contexts of use in which specific rules are at play (cf. *PI*: 206). In this remark, language is no longer treated as subject to specific modes of employment but becomes part of speakers' everyday usage (see Figure 2). Yet, signs cannot mean in certain language games (cf. *PI*: 300). Another good example of how signs can be useless in certain contexts is provided in *PI*: 670. Here, an *index*[2] fails to mean at all. On the other hand, indices, or as Wittgenstein calls them, "*bildliche Ausdrücke*" (graphic expressions), can be useful in identifying certain online expressions:

> Denk, du telephonierst jemandem und sagst ihm: „Dieser Tisch ist zu hoch", wobei du mit dem Finger auf den Tisch zeigst. Welche Rolle spielt hier das Zeigen? Kann ich sagen: ich *meine* den betreffenden Tisch, indem ich auf ihn zeige? Wozu dieses Zeigen, und wozu diese Worte und was sonst sie begleiten mag? (*PI*: 670)

> ['Imagine that you were talking on the phone with someone and you said to him "This table is too tall" while you point at the table. What is the role of such pointing here? Can I say: I *mean* the table in question as I point at it? What is the purpose of this pointing, or of these words, or whatever else may accompany them?']

3 A semiosic translation *"Bild"*

In translating the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*, I am clearly committing to the view that such a philosophical inquiry is constrained by the limits of our interpretation of Wittgenstein's intentions. Therefore, in defining what makes us follow one

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2 I adopt here the Peircean triadic classification of signs. This is not intended to cram Peirce's semiotics into Wittgenstein's (anti)philosophy, but to offer a semiotic scaffolding to certain semiotic uses in the Wittgensteinian work. The Peircean taxonomy is summarized as follows:

"One very important triad is this: it has been found that there are three kinds of signs which are all indispensable in all reasoning; the first is the diagrammatic sign or *icon,* which exhibits a similarity or analogy to the subject of discourse; the second is the *index,* which like a pronoun demonstrative or relative, forces the attention to the particular object intended without describing it; the third [or *symbol*] is the general name or description which signifies its object by means of an association of ideas or habitual connection between the name and the character signified." (*CP* 1.369)

Figure 2: The model of sign in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

rule instead of another (a translation instead of another), or why linguistic expressions are made to mean one thing rather than another, it is the case that any "acceptance of a rule is an irreducibly intentional state" (Miller 2015: 415). Yet we face the question of how an appeal to intentions can provide context to meaning, since an acceptance of the rule does not entail the correctness of an action in accordance to the rule. This is due to the fact that an accepted rule-following is not necessarily a proof to the rule itself vis-à-vis the agent's intention. Notwithstanding, the tacit intention is not the case here. Any intention has a context that determines its explanation and further rationalization.

In this sense, any effective translational approach must (a) remediate the sometimes wrongly claimed association of meaning put forward under the rubrics of a *single term* (conditioning what the term is intended to mean), which prevents the philosopher from actually grasping the concept in all its vastness; (b) once the word-meaning relationship has been established, the translator must proceed to restate this relation, re-establish the semiotic connection, and, finally, produce a suitable translation of the concept. For the purposes of this paper, I have chosen the term *"Bild,"* which has been

problematic, if not completely elusive for Wittgenstein translators like G. E. M. Anscombe.[3] This is, of course, not a straightforward operation,[4] and in order to succeed, the translator of both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* must take into consideration both the philosopher's intention, as well as the structure of the target text. Interestingly, the systemic reading favored in this paper draws on a recent discovery regarding the tree-like architecture of the *Tractatus* (Bazzocchi 2010). Bazzocchi's book is a signal moment for the *Tractatus* scholarship, since it deftly demonstrates that the *Tractatus* is not to be read linearly but sequentially "*in accordance with the numbering system*, and that *demands* that the reader follow the text after the manner of a logical tree" (Hacker 2015: 649, italics in original). This makes up a system in its own right governed by seven cardinal propositions (non-decimal), and 519 propositions used iteratively to comment and reinforce one another (see Subsection 4.2.1). In respect to this, the tree-like structure of the *Tractatus* highlights an explanatory dimension that may serve as a useful reminder of the elusive connection between individual terms, remarks, and the sequence of these remarks.

3.1 Translating "Bild"

As noted earlier, intention leads to *translational hypotheses* within a sign system. So it turns out that although intentions cannot generate hypotheses by themselves, capable of revealing the grounds upon which signification is based, they can by all means organize *complexes*, i.e., specific dispositions of objects arranged in cognizable patterns through recursion. Such complexes are not facts (*Tatsachen*) themselves given their contingent status. The constitution of a picture of the outward reality is best accomplished through an iconic representation (resemblance). The interplay of these elements can thus be deemed to form a sign system. An awareness of the nature of the system goes some way toward explaining why the later Wittgenstein is reluctant to view language as a reliable vehicle of representations, despite the language-thought correspondence of the early Wittgenstein and the consequences which that attempt carried in its train. In view of this, language must be treated not as a fixed symbolic system, but as a dynamic composite of signs.

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3 As I shall indicate later in this paper, Anscombe's translations of Wittgenstein's works, though widely cited, have been contended by many authors dissatisfied with her inconsistent and sometimes inaccurate translations of key concepts.

4 It is not news that *Bild*, as many other terms used in the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, is ambiguous and context-dependent. However, it stands to reason to explore why this is the case, especially when a single word ("picture") fails to capture specific nuances.

The upshot from the above arguments is that every use of the term *Bild* necessitates a context in which further uses of the same term cannot be determined *a priori* by means of an identification of specific themes. For example, in associating *Bild* with specific themes, Zelger (2004) faces the problem of deciding which use of *Bild* corresponds to one or more of the *themes* selected. This means that a translation of the term does not consist in mere permutations of one single instance of *Bild* (in this case, associated with an equivalent word in English, namely *"picture"*), but a semantic hub connected to other potential semantic hubs in English. This results in the consolidation of *multisemiotic translational paths* not predefined by the sole action of language (e.g., translating *Bild* as *picture* in all contexts).[5]

Importantly, before drawing any conclusion regarding the use of the word "picture" as a translation of *Bild* in Wittgenstein's flagship works, we must first determine what specific meaning is being invoked in each remark; otherwise it would be impossible to grasp the sense of the context in which the concept appears. So, instead of postulating a fits-all-size solution, we should contrue *Bild* as a semiotic frame through which we are invited to look and see a set of intended complexes or states of affairs (Sachverhalten) in relation to other concepts. Since not all propositions pursue the same explanatory goal, the apparent meaning concealed by the *sign-word* is thus nonsensical (despite their senseful grammatical coating within a remark). This occurs because no specific meaning has been really assigned to the term *Bild* in a given remark. Therefore, whereas the word "picture" can accommodate the semiotic system of the remark, and thereby look senseful, we are left wondering whether the actual meaning of "*Bild*" and the use Wittgenstein put it to is really in keeping with its actual English rendering. In translating semiotically, therefore, we have to interrogate some key terms in order to figure out whether they are senseful or not. In other words, *Bild*, or any other term, is a section of a hypothesis elaborated heuristically in the works of Wittgenstein.

It follows that the illusion by which certain objects are seen behind the surface of a word militates against comprehension. Since words cannot

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5 For example, the pair *Bild-picture* used by Anscombe, is decidedly ambiguous and contradictory in some contexts, since the overgeneralization of the term fails to capture subtle shades of meaning in the original text. It should be noted, however, that Anscombe's work remains an impressive accomplishment given the breadth and scope of the task she had at hand. As Hacker and Schulte (in Wittgenstein 2009 [1953]: xviii) observe, Anscombe "invented an English equivalent for Wittgenstein's distinctive, often colloquial style. This was no mean feat. For she had to find not only linguistic analogues of Wittgenstein's stylistic idiosyncrasies, but also English rhythm that could convey the character of Wittgenstein's carefully crafted prose. Her success is indisputable."

represent the absoluteness of an object, even when they seem to establish a literal relation with it, such connection is weakened by our interpretive expectations. Significantly, Wittgenstein's particular use of *Bild* is framed in a *tripartite image* consisting of a *sign*, a *non-object*, and an *idea*. The sign arranges cognitively the sequence and organization of non-objects in a complex, whereby an idea of it emerges as a concept. Some such restatement of the role of words is essential for our comprehension of Wittgenstein's sign system. In so doing we shall not derive the structure of the system from language rules, which could prevent the system from deploying its full semiotic potential.

In this sense, the suggested semiosic translation intends to plunge the reader/viewer into the world of the remark which is not purely linguistic. From the outset, the translational act is intent on finding a new way of representing the complex semiotic reality of the Wittgensteinian remarks, not merely to observe it, but to get to the heart of it, thereby stressing the *liveness* of the representational act (the reader is immersed in an intended actuality), as well as the purposefulness thereof. On any such view, the delay (misunderstanding) is only caused when a dynamic composite text is reduced to its linguistic components.

From this semiotic perspective, we are better enabled to appreciate the means of Wittgenstein's method, since translation is no longer made to rest upon any supposed equivalence between the source text and the target text. The adoption of this position involves the giving up of the traditional *readerly* (source-driven) concern in favor of a *writerly* (target-oriented) one, whereby linguistic layers are discarded as inefficacious appearances (cf. Torres-Martínez 2015). In the service of these criteria, the term *Bild* is deemed to organize around a system of nodes revealing patterns of continuity and semantic gradation. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein uses the term *Bild* for the first time in remark 2.0212 with the sense of *picture* (a characterization picture), which establishes a connection between the cognizing mind of the observer and the world:

> Es wäre dann unmöglich, ein Bild der Welt (wahr oder falsch) zu entwerfen. (*TLP*: 2.0212)
> ['It would be then impossible to posit an image of the world (true or false).']

This acceptation of the term is later downplayed in favor of a more restricted usage (image), related with Wittgenstein's conceptualization of sign, i.e. "what can be perceived of a symbol" (*TLP*: 3.32), which roughly goes from 2.1513 to 2.18, and from 2.181 to 3.01 respectively. The notion of "*representation*" appears in remarks 4.01, 4.011, 4.021 in the sense of a *partially-cognizable state of affairs*

(*Sachverhalt*), whereby a contingent event in the outward reality is linked with a certain serendipitous disposition of the mind to follow an emergent rule. As previously noted, the elucidatory remarks in the *Tractatus* can be used to explain a main proposition. For example, proposition 4 is explained by an elucidatory sequence going from 4.01 to 4.06, "equipollent with the sequence 4.1–4.5" (Hacker 2015: 652). However, the system of elucidatory sequences does not preclude the semantic shifts constrained by the remark in which they appear. Thus, in remark 4.032, *Bild* (in this case translated as "image") is associated with the term *Satz* (proposition). *Bild* in 4.063 refers to a simile, a comparison, or an analogy, while in 4.463, it means *image* again. In remark 6.6341, *Bild* can be translated as "*mapping-picture*" and in 3.342 and 3.35 as *image*. Suffice to say for the moment that these translations provide a first glimpse into the nature of Wittgenstein's sign system in the *Tractatus*. Notwithstanding, although these usages of *Bild* represent a distinct state of development in Wittgenstein's thought at the time of the composition of the *Tractatus* (which also provides insight into the stage of development of his ideas in *MS 104*),[6] there is a strong correlation between the *Tractarian* uses of *Bild* and those in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Yet, as revealed, it would be an over-simplification to state that every occurrence of *Bild*, even within a single remark, can be related with a single meaning. For example, *PI*: 73 contains three variations of *Bild: Bild 1* (idea), *Bild 2* (image), and *Bild 3* (mapping-picture). As can be seen from Figure 3, remark 73 (a sub-system) provides several cues regarding the possible translation of *Bild* in this specific context. For example, *Bild 1* (idea) is associated with the notion of *Muster* (model). *Bild 2* (image), is related with the adverbial phrase "im Geiste" ('in the mind'), while *Bild 3* (picture) is hinted at by the verb "ausschauen" ("look like"). It follows that the internal variability of *Bild* in the *Philosophical Investigations* can be grasped through resort to an association between the term and "forms (*Formen*) and objects (*Gegenstände*)" only:

> Der Schlüsselbegriff „Bild" wird von Wittgenstein vorwiegend mit „Form(en)" und „Gegenstand" in Zusammenhang gebracht sowie damit, daß das Bild auf einen Gegenstand zeigt, der durch Vergleich mit den Formen des Bildes wiedererkannt wird. (Zelger 2004: 9)

> ['The key term "Bild" is used by Wittgenstein in relation to "Form(s)" and "Objects." At the same time, Bild points to an object that is recognizable through comparison with the form of the picture.']

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6 The manuscript *MS 104* (held at the Bodleian Library at Oxford University) is the main text providing a glimpse into the formation of the *Tractatus*.

Figure 3: A semiotic sub-system in remark 73.

It stands to reason, then, that the internal semantic variability of *Bild* within some remarks points to high levels of diversity within the macrosystem of the *Investigations*. Therefore, the different meanings of *Bild* in the *Philosophical Investigations* can be visualized as a network of interconnected hubs. This applies equally well to the relation of two semiotic macrosystems, namely, that of the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. Interestingly, in *PI*: 115, Wittgenstein reminds us of his former use of *Bild* in the *Tractatus*, as he concedes that "[e]in Bild hielt uns gefangen" ('A picture held us captive'). Had we not already established the identity of the *Tractarian* usage of *image* (associated with that of symbol), this reference would have gone unnoticed from the perspective of a linguistic analysis as a means to understand the paradigmatic shift intended by Wittgenstein in the *Investigations*: "to move words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (*PI*: 116).

Here, it seems best to view remarks not in the context of language-thought equivalence, but both as concepts and usage-based representations related to specific functions. Seen through this lens, language cannot function the same as thought, since what is thinkable and sayable in a language, is not equally

thinkable and sayable in another language. This winnows out any substantial aprioricity in our construction of representations. On the other hand, the unsatisfactoriness of the use of the term *"picture"* in traditional linguistic translations, as a catch-all equivalent of *"Bild,"* is traceable to a *Tractarian* view of language whereby an alleged formal correspondence between reality and language is posited. However, no word can be said to be intrinsically connected with reality so as to enable us to postulate an unambiguous correlativity between sign and object. The fundamental point here can be put thus: While the linguistic formal identity established by the sign-meaning association fails to specify the way reality is organized, the semiotic reading enables us to establish how reality *is* at some point of our intended inquiry in everyday use (cf. *PI*: 43, 116). To put the point from a different angle, the appeal to inference in the semiotic reading suggested in this paper, can also be regarded as a means to imaginatively realize (in a concrete form) the underlying relations of a Wittgensteinian sign system throughout his works. This can be said to draw on an antecedently existing semiotic system ("Gedankengebiet," *PI*: 9), whereupon external relations (realized, for example, in the form of language games) ground themselves.

4 One term, five translations

In this section, I introduce five possible translations of the term *Bild* used by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the *Philosophical Investigations*, and the *Philosophy of Psychology*[7]: *image, mapping-picture, representation, idea,* and *factual picture*. As shown in Table 1, the semantic gradation of *Bild* in the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* (including the *Philosophy of Psychology*) is much more evident than in previous linguistic translations. (I shall take this up in the subsequent sub-sections).

4.1 Bild as image

The first semiosic translation of the term *Bild* is *image*. A *Tractarian* image is a type of sign that establishes a connection between the cognizing mind and the world. The semiotic relation between a sign and its object is thus psychological, that is, it operates on general cognitive mechanisms. These are at play during the perception

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[7] The *Philosophy of Psychology* was formerly known as "Part Two" in previous versions of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Table 1: Frequency and distribution of the different translations of *Bild* in both the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* (including the Philosophy of Psychology).

Translation	Philosophical Investigations		Tractatus		Philosophy of Psychology	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Image	5.9 %	11	1.5 %	1	0.0 %	0
Mapping-picture	36.4 %	68	76.5 %	52	0.0 %	0
Representation	9.6 %	18	2.9 %	2	4.0 %	2
Idea	4.3 %	8	1.5 %	1	20.0 %	10
Factual-Picture	41.7 %	78	10.3 %	7	76.0 %	38

of an object, which triggers an alignment between a representational system in the mind and the external reality organized dynamically as a recognizable network of intersemiotic relations. Formal identity (but not of content) thus presupposes a stage of iconic alignment between the reality "*as is*" and the human perceptual apparatus (see Figure 4). This is exemplified in the use of *Bild* in *PI*: 139:


Figure 4: *Bild* as representation of state of affairs.

> Was ist es denn eigentlich, was uns vorschwebt, wenn wir ein Wort *verstehen*? – Ist es nicht etwas, wie ein Bild? Kann es nicht ein Bild *sein*? (*PI*: 139)

> [' ... what really comes to our mind when we *understand* a word- Isn't it something like an image? Can't it *be* an image?']

As shown, the term *Bild* stands here for a budding representation and not for a symbol, in the Peircean sense of law, habit, or convention (see *CP* 1.369). This is tricky, since "to understand a word" could be interpreted as if the type of understanding Wittgenstein was evoking was "*organic*," that is, one that can be described as "understanding" meaning, or thinking with signs. This inorganic acceptation of *Bild* takes the lion's share in the *Tractatus*, for example in remark 2.0212:

> Es ware dann unmöglich, ein Bild der Welt (wahr oder falsch) zu entwerfen.

> ['It would be then impossible to sketch an image of the world (true or false).']

However, the definition of *Bild* as *image* is slightly different here, since the *Tractarian* image is bound up with the idea of *simple objects* ("einfache Gegenstände") as a sum of all state of affairs. Hence, *Bild* refers here to a type of representation connected with the existence of *atomic facts* (Sachverhalten). These are, in turn, made up of a combination of indeterminate objects (entities, things; cf. *TLP*: 2.01). Inevitably, then, a semiotic distinction between *Bild* in the *Tractatus* and in the *Philosophical Investigations* must be drawn. Therefore, the generality of the *Tractarian* objects points to the realization of *Bild* as an indeterminate representation having an iconic potential which has to be "apt for truth or falsity" (Campbell 2014: 151). On the other hand, *Bild* in the *Philosophical Investigations* does not depend on the rules of logical syntax, their objects being cognizable through the use they are put to in a given language game.

4.2 Bild as "*mapping-picture*" in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

In the *Tractatus*, "*mapping-picture*" is a type of sign that provides the perceiver with a contingent map of reality. This sign is related with a symbol which, as previously noted, is a scratch of a sign, a manifestation of its conventionalized logical employment. The resulting picture must bear resemblance with its signified to become a symbol in its own right:

> Der Satz ist ein Bild der Wirklichkeit. Der Satz ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit, so wie wir sie uns denken. (*TLP*: 4.01)

> ['The proposition is a mapping-picture of reality. The proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.']

In addition, Wittgenstein confirms the association of a symbol with signs in the mind:

> Offenbar ist, daß wir einen Satz von der Form 'aRb' als Bild empfinden. Hier ist das Zeichen offenbar ein Gleichnis des Bezeichneten. (*TLP*: 4.012)

> ['It is clear that we perceive a proposition of the form 'aRb' as a mapping picture. Here, the sign is obviously a likeness of the signified.']

4.2.1 Bazzocchi's tree-metaphor and the picture theory

As already mentioned, the *Tractatus* is to be read as a hypertext with its 526 remarks arranged as the branches of a tree (Bazzocchi 2010). Bazzocchi's approach is hermeneutical and rests on the assumption that the *Tractatus* "is not a sequential book but a *hierarchical object*" (Bazzocchi 2015: 333). In this sense,

> If the *Tractatus* is (what I consider for certain) a hierarchical text – a hypertext, indeed – we cannot imagine that Wittgenstein constructed it in ascending numerical order. Thus, we must expect to find in his "laboratory" some working instrument with the same goal as those of the engineers (don't forget that Wittgenstein *was* an engineer, too). (Bazzocchi 2015: 334; emphasis in original)

Hence, a transition between different *levels of elucidation*, based on seven cardinal propositions (the roots of the tree), namely, *1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,* and *7*, should be envisaged:

1. Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist. ['The world is all that is the case']
2. Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten. ['What is the case, the fact, is the existence of a state of affairs']
3. Das logische Bild der Tatsachen ist der Gedanke. ['Thought is the logical picture of facts']
4. Der Gedanke ist der sinnvolle Satz. ['Thought is a meaningful proposition']
5. Die Elementarsätze sind die Wahrheitsargumente des Satzes. ['An elementary proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions']
6. Die allgemeine Form der Wahrheitsfunktion ist: $[p, \xi, N(\xi)]$. Dies ist die allgemeine Form des Satzes. ['The general form of the truth-function is: $[p, \xi, N(\xi)]$. This is the general form of the proposition']
7. Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen. ['One must go on silently on what cannot be expressed with words']

Cardinal propositions are then expanded by means of *sequential clarifications* (also referred to as commenting remarks, i.e., *Bemerkungen*), arranged horizontally (see Figure 5). As can be seen, a proposition *n* is expanded by a proposition *n*.1, *n*.1 is commented by *n.o*1, and so on.

Figure 5: Meaning expansion from *cardinal propositions* via commenting remarks.

By using Bazzocchi's interpretation of the *Tractatus* as a hierarchical hypertext, it is possible to trace how the "*mapping-picture*" translation aptly grasps the text's tree-wise architecture. In point of fact, in translating *Bild* as a "sign associated with a symbol," the pictorial dyadic-symbolic character of the German term becomes evident. Rather than seeing "*mapping-picture*" as a predictable translation applicable to a sequence of consecutively-arranged remarks, the hypertext-reading model sheds light on an elaborated network of interconnected semiotic hubs starting with remark 2.1, which is commented by a sequence of remarks (from 2.11 to 2.19), customarily referred to as the "*picture theory*," and that can be summarized as follows:

> We make ourselves mapping pictures of facts in a logical space (*TLP*: 2.11). Pictures provide a glimpse into reality (*TLP*: 2.12) by showing us how objects are arranged in a certain way (this is the *structure of the picture*) (*TLP*: 2.13, 2.14). That this map is possible constitutes its *pictorial form* (*TLP*: 2.15, 2.16). Mapping pictures correspond to objects only if they share a *logical form* with them (*TLP*: 2.17, 2.18). Ultimately, logical mapping-pictures depict the world, that is, meaning arises from the syntactical application of signs according to logical rules.

This description of the *picture theory* can now be read against the backdrop of the provided translation, thus: The object (and its associated sign) becomes a symbol for the experiencer (which constitutes a fact in its own right). Facts are arranged in a logical way, which entails the potentiality of further combinatorics thereof to form other mapping-pictures. The structure of the mapping-picture represents its potential to become a sign itself (its pictorial form). Mapping-pictures must share a pictorial form with reality, but, in order to depict anything at all, they must also

share a logical form with the facts they represent. This logical form is a symbol encompassing the world's possible combinations of mapping-pictures which can be true or false. Since mapping-pictures are constructions of reality (name and potential combinations of objects) they are not simply "models" providing spatial cues. The pictorial form of spatiality (cf. *The Notebooks*) is simply one of the many possible mental mappings available. Indeed, the term "*mapping-picture*" used here, elaborates on cardinal remarks 1 and 2: *the world is a fact describable through logical pictures*. Logical pictures represent the arrangement of facts in the form of signs, i.e., "general propositional form is the sole logical constant" (Cheung 2006: 23). Signs are not absolute representations of reality, but recognizable instances of a symbol. A symbol represents the logical arrangement of facts (the world). Hence, the world is a complex of symbols. As Mezzadri (2014: 210) observes, "[c]entral to the *Tractatus*' account of propositional complexity, therefore, is the 'identity requirement,' the idea that having sense (representing a situation) amounts to propositional elements (names) being arranged *in the same way* as the elements of the represented state of affairs are arranged." Further, in remark 2.2, Wittgenstein notes: "the picture shares with the signified its logico-pictorial form." The relation between the picture and the signified thus builds on a semiotic identity established between the two in terms of form and possibility, that is, "a picture must have the *same* structure as the state of affairs it represents" (Mezzadri 2014: 209). This reasoning is further pursued in the next level of elucidation going from 2.131 to 2.182. As shown in Figure 6, the term *Bild* in the *Tractatus* (associated with cardinal


Figure 6: The term *Bild* as used in specific remarks distributed in the tree.

propositions 2, 3, 4, and 6) is mostly used in the sense of a "mapping-picture," expanding cardinal proposition 2 via 2.1, 2.2, 2.01, and 2.02 (in blue), and only marginally as "idea" (in yellow) and "factual picture" (in red).

It becomes evident from the above discussion that the assignation of a single linguistic term ("Model") is misleading. Even if we were to accept that *Bild* means "*model*," it is doubtful that Wittgenstein would have preferred to use *Bild* instead of *Modell* in this context. In a similar vein, the term "*literal pictures*" (cf. Egan 2011; Hacker 2015) as a translation of *Bild* in *TLP:* 4.063, 6.341, 6.342, and 6.35, should not be freely associated with Wittgenstein's *picture theory* on the grounds of the incompatibility of these pictures with the former's logical requirements (a distinction that Wittgenstein himself never envisioned).

4.3 Mapping-pictures in the *Philosophical Investigations*

There is a distinction to be made between the use of *mapping-pictures* in the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*. While in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein addresses the language-world identity in terms of form (whereby pictures are void of any substantial apriority) in the *Investigations* mapping-pictures become a means to establish an extended connection between language, reality and use. Therefore, use contains form, which provides pictures with meaningful content. The result is a characterization of mapping-pictures as cognizable relations between signs and the objects they refer to: For example, in *PI*: 2 "slab," is a symbol defined by the action it prompts "within a practice, language-game that one can call for building stones" (Gerrard 1991: 110). In other words, the sole possibility of getting some acquaintance with reality is through symbols. The main difference resides in the way meaning is grasped. Rather than positing solipsistic computations in the form of mental algorithms in a logical space, the symbolic character of mapping-pictures in the *Investigations* allows perceivers to engage in context-driven interpretations in different situations. All in all, "'the world' and the 'objects' that make it up are given for each of us by the language we have" (Robinson 2000: 281). Therefore, in the *Investigations*, a sign and its image would be meaningless without a use. Moreover, "Wittgenstein's use has no internal connection to truth at all; it is meaning, not truth, that is internally linked to truth" (Moyal–Sharrock 2003: 125).

4.4 Bild as "*representation*"

The translation of the term *Bild* as "representation" in the *Philosophical Investigations* refers to a place-holding composite picture of an undefined object that emerges as a partially-cognizable state of affairs (Sachverhalt). It links a

contingent object in the world with a type of reasoning that maps signs onto objects or events. Therefore, partially-cognizable means here that a representation is only partially associated with the object with which it is related, by means of a mirror-like relation (*PI*: 604). Clearly then, a representation is limited by any personal experience which cannot be completely extended to the experiences of other individuals on the grounds of a shared cognitive architecture. If follows that any representation is superficial and for that reason lacks a true identity with its object (*PI*: 605).

4.5 Bild as "*idea*"

The notion of "*idea*" in the *Philosophical Investigations* equates two cognitive processes which results in the convergence of pairs of signs expressing similar chains of reasoning. The signs in a pair are the product of a purposeful action of the mind that overrides their apparent resemblance as the sole symptom of a potential use. The resulting meaning includes what Wittgenstein calls a "*Vorstellungsbild*," i.e., an idea used to describe a mental picture:

> Denk, wir drückten die Absicht eines Menschen immer so aus, indem wir sagen: "Er sagte gleichsam zu sich selbst „Ich will ..." – Das ist das Bild. Und nun will ich wissen: Wie verwendet man den Ausdruck "etwas gleichsam zu sich selbst sagen"? Denn er bedeutet nicht: etwas zu sich selbst sagen. (*PI*: 658)

> ['Let's imagine we want to describe the intention of a man by saying: "He said to himself something like "I want ..." That is the idea. And now I want to know: How can one use the expression "to say something like ... to oneself?" Then this does not mean: to say something to oneself.']

4.6 Bild as "*factual picture*"

Finally, the term "*factual picture*" refers to a physical support (a drawing, painting, etching, etc.).[8] As such, they are physical renderings (or mental representations thereof) of ideas, mental pictures, objects, or events which are not comparable with those used in the picture theory (nor are they "literal" in any sense). These pictures encapsulate concepts in the form of *icons* (meaning by resemblance) or *indices* (meaning by contiguity), i.e., signs which are used by Wittgenstein to illustrate philosophical problems in both the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*:

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8 Here, Ogden and Ramsey use the term "*illustration*", while Pears and McGuiness prefer "*analogy*."

Iconic

Ein Bild zur Erklärung des Wahrheitsbegriffes: Schwarzer Fleck auf weißem Papier ... (*TLP*: 4.063)

['A factual picture to explain the concept of truth: A black spot on white paper ... ']

Indexical

Was wir „Beschreibungen" nennen, sind Instrumente für besondere Verwendungen. Denke dabei an eine Maschinenzeichnung, einen Schnitt, einen Aufriß mit den Maßen, den der Mechaniker vor sich hat. Wenn man an eine Beschreibung als ein Wortbild der Tatsachen denkt, so hat das etwas Irreführendes: Man denkt etwa nur an Bilder, wie sie an unsern Wänden hängen; die schlechtweg abzubilden scheinen, wie ein Ding aussieht, wie es beschaffen ist. (Diese Bilder sind gleichsam müßig.) (*PI* : 291)

['What we call "descriptions "are tools for particular uses. Imagine a machine-drawing, a cross-section, an elevation with measures, which an engineer has before him. To characterize descriptions as surrogates of things is misleading: One thinks only of factual pictures hanging on our walls, which seem simply to depict how things look, how they are made (These are, so to speak, idle pictures).']

5 Conclusion

In carving out a space for *Bild* as an intrinsically polysemous and context dependent term embedded in a system of complex semiotic relations, the reading suggested in this paper provides a potentially more productive way forward for philosophical translation that transcends the traditional linguistic approach. This is particularly evident in the case of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* whose hypertextual structure reveals both the unity and diversity at the core of the system carefully crafted by Wittgenstein in his works. By refusing to employ a single, standard translation ('picture'), I have shown that there is indeed a nuanced semiotic substrate that should be taken into consideration. To that end, I have provided a set of possible English terms reflecting the special bond between micro- and macro-semiotic systems within the works analyzed. In this sense, the present essay seeks to lay a foundation for future scholarly work on the dynamic nature of philosophical texts (understood as sign systems in their own right), a fact often glossed over or neglected entirely in favor of looking at some familiar philosophical idiom.

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